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ΘΕΜΑ: «ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΙΑΚΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΤΩΝ ΗΝΩΜΕΝΩΝ ΕΘΝΩΝ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΤΙΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΛΩΤΗΣ ΜΟΝΑΔΑΣ ΑΠΟΘΗΚΕΥΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΦΟΡΤΩΣΗΣ (FSO) SAFER ΣΤΗΝ ΥΕΜΕΝΗ.».

ΣΧΕΤ: Το από 29.03.2022 (01.31 μμ) Μ.Η.Τ ΥΠΕΞ/Α6 (μπσ)

1. Με ανωτέρω σχετικό, μας κοινοποιήθηκε Επιχειρησιακό Σχέδιο επίλυσης του ζητήματος που έχει προκύψει με την μακρά παραμονή της ανενεργούς πλωτής μονάδας αποθήκευσης πετρελαιοειδών (FSO) «Safer», στα ανοιχτά της Υεμένης, που εκπονήθηκε για λογαριασμό των Ηνωμένων Εθνών.

2. Κατόπιν των ανωτέρω, αποστέλλεται το εν λόγω επιχειρησιακό σχέδιο προς ενημέρωσή σας. Σε περίπτωση που ήθελε, εκ μέρους μέλους σας, εκφρασθεί ενδιαφέρον επί των διαλαμβανομένων σε αυτό, σε συνάρτηση ιδίως με την εκναύλωση πλοίου αντικατάστασης της ανωτέρω FSO, δύναται να έλθει σε επαφή με την αρμόδια χειρίστρια ΥΠΕΞ, κα. ΚΑΝΑΚΗ Ελένη, (Γραμματέας Πρεσβείας Γ', 2103681187,6971727290, kanaki.eleni@mfa.gr).

3. Παρακαλείσθε για την ενημέρωσή σας.

Ο Διευθυντής

Επισυνάπτονται:

Τα αναφερόμενο στο κείμενο (σελ. 13)

Πλοίαρχος ΛΣ Χρήστος Κοντορουχάς

Ψηφιακά υπογεγραμμένο από ANASTASIA DEMISKI
Ημερομηνία: 2022.04.04 09:41:40 EEST
Αιτία: ΑΚΡΙΒΕΣ ΑΝΤΙΓΡΑΦΟ



FSO SAFER: operational plan

March 2022



1 The FSO Safer: a problem and its solution

1.1. The problem

The Floating Storage and Offloading Unit (FSO) Safer is moored approximately 4.8 nautical miles off the coast of Yemen. Constructed in 1976 as an oil tanker and converted in 1987 into a floating storage facility, the vessel is single-hulled, 376 meters in length and contains an estimated 1.14 million barrels of light crude oil. It has been under the control of the de facto authorities in Sana'a (hereafter referred to as the DFA) since March 2015. Production and offloading operations are suspended due to the conflict situation in the area and no maintenance operations have been undertaken since 2015. Safety systems and gas monitoring systems have not been maintained and therefore there is an increased risk for fires and explosions. The FSO's insurance cover has lapsed and it is now uninsurable as its certificate of seaworthiness has expired. The Safer's age and lack of maintenance have resulted in significant deterioration of its structural integrity and the vessel is at risk of spilling oil due to leakages, an explosion in its tanks, or a strike from a floating mine. A significant spill could occur at any time and would quickly surpass national capacity and resources to mount an effective spill response. The consequences of a spill would thus be catastrophic, devastating the Yemen coast, destroying livelihoods and forcing a closure of the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef - which are essential for the importation of life-saving humanitarian assistance and food for millions of civilians affected by the conflict. The unique environment of the Red Sea would suffer enormous damage. Depending on the season and prevailing wind and currents, the environmental impact also risks affecting Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, and would disrupt vital shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea. The recent explosion of the Trinity Spirit, a vessel carrying considerably less oil than the Safer, underlines the risk of a serious spill. The clean-up costs alone for a spill from the Safer are estimated to be up to USD 20bn¹, based on Exxon Valdez costs. In addition, there would be massive economic losses due to the contamination of shipping lanes.²

1.2. Proposed solution

The long-term solution to the FSO Safer is to provide a replacement FSO – a storage and offloading vessel that remains in a permanent location. However, FSOs – unlike normal tankers – are not commonly available and are usually made to order by adapting an ordinary oil tanker. This adaptation is a complex process that takes around 18 months. Initial enquiries revealed that no FSOs are currently available on the market, thus the adaptation route will have to be followed. However, a technical review carried out by SMIT, including discussions held at Ras Issa, gives reason to believe that the vessel is at risk of being the cause of a major oil spill and thus constitutes an emergency situation that cannot wait 18 months. The United Nations (UN) has therefore developed an operational plan that has two processes going forward in parallel: the first – the primary plan - comprising technical work with SMIT on the provision of a permanent solution; and the second – the emergency action plan – being the temporary ship-to-ship transfer of the Safer's cargo of crude oil into a replacement tanker. Given the urgency, a budgeted proposal for a temporary replacement vessel has been developed as part of this operational plan.

¹ FSO SAFER: Understanding the Risks and assessing the impact, ACAPS assessment for IMO March 2022

² For example, the Ever Given container ship in the Suez Canal froze US\$10 billion of trade in one day.

1.3 The UN role

In September 2021, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen (RC/HC) was requested by UN HQ in New York to provide UN system-wide leadership and coordinate all efforts to mitigate the threats posed by the FSO Safer. The work builds on the earlier agreement in principle between the DFA and the Fahem Group to have SMIT carry out a ship-to-ship transfer of the oil and clean-up of the tanks and responds to the requests of both SMIT and the DFA that the UN hold the contracts for the work. The UN agreed to this because of the significant environmental and humanitarian impact of any oil spill, an event that must be avoided if at all possible. Accordingly, the RC/HC and his office has worked in collaboration with the relevant UN specialist agencies to develop the plan outlined below. In parallel with this the UN has held discussions with all the main stakeholders and has developed a funding strategy.

While the overall project is under the leadership of the RC/HC, UNDP will be responsible for the project management of the emergency plan. This includes leasing of the replacement vessel, contracting the vessel crew, and maintenance and insurance of the vessel. In December 2021 a meeting of the UN Principals was held in New York and UNDP was instructed to fast-track a single-source procurement with SMIT Salvage. The necessary due diligence work for this is now underway and should be complete by 31 March. This proposal assumes a successful outcome of that process. UNDP, as the contract holder, will develop a full project document with a detailed budget as the basis for receiving funds from the Peace Support Facility (PSF).

While the final timelines are contingent on the provision of funding, without which contracts cannot be awarded, the aim is to have commenced the contract by 1st May, thus ensuring that the work can be completed before winter winds and sea conditions put additional stress on the mooring system of the FSO Safer and make conditions more dangerous. A timeline for the technical work can be found in section 3, and for the overall project in section 10.

2 Agreements with the Yemeni authorities and other stakeholders

Previous difficulties underlined the importance of having a clear and detailed agreement with the authorities before the work commences. The RC/HC thus met with key members of the DFA on a number of occasions and they stressed their commitment to seeing a solution to the risk posed by the FSO Safer, viewing this as a matter of urgency. On 5th March, the DFA signed an agreement with the UN and the Fahem Group that recognised the threat posed by Safer, the need for a replacement equivalent to the FSO Safer, and that a temporary tanker may be required.

Discussions have also been held with the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen (IRG), which recognises the common interest in preventing an oil spill and agrees that the only effective way forward is to engage with the DFA to find a solution. This proposal has been discussed and agreed with the authorities in Aden. The consent of the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) has also been obtained and assurances have been given that the area around the Safer will be placed in a no-strike zone via the UN's normal procedures. All parties stress the need for urgent action and see the avoidance of a humanitarian and environmental disaster as of the utmost importance.

3. The Primary Plan: finding a permanent solution

The UN with the support of SMIT will work with the DFA to explore technical options for meeting its requirement for an export facility. This will include:

- Looking at options to source a tanker for conversion to an FSO;
- Investigating yards that can undertake such a conversion and undertaking a quality assessment;
- Identifying alternative options to replace the FSO Safer— for instance, the installation of a Catenary Anchorage Leg Mooring Buoy (CALM Buoy) with a very large crude carrier (VLCC) semi-permanently moored to the buoy and able to act as an FSO.

A detailed operational primary plan, with a budget, will be produced once SMIT has undertaken these initial investigations and parties involved agree on the preferred solution.

4. The Emergency Action Plan

4.1 Objective

As noted in section 1, the situation is urgent and cannot wait 18 months for a solution. An emergency plan has therefore been developed with the objective of undertaking a rapid transfer of the Safer cargo of crude oil into a temporary safe tanker, along with a cleaning of the Safer's tanks, in order to prevent an environmental and humanitarian disaster. Subject to final approval of Boskalis board of management, this will be carried out by SMIT Salvage, an experienced contractor with the relevant expertise in highly complex environments. Upon completion of these works the FSO Safer will no longer pose an environmental risk and can be left at its mooring until another FSO is in place.

4.2 The technical emergency plan

The technical plan has been prepared by SMIT Salvage. Once a suitable vessel is procured, the aim is to execute a ship-to-ship transfer (STS) of the oil. It is anticipated that the operation will require around four months to complete and will consist of the phases outlined below. Variable factors can impact the duration of the activities and thus the timeline serves only as a guide. Although not all technical details from FSO Safer are available at the moment of writing this plan, SMIT Salvage's experience, track record and expansive networks in the industry have made it possible to prepare a realistic plan to execute the transfer operation. This technical proposal will be further fine-tuned once more details become available to SMIT. The phases envisaged are:

Preparatory works

- UNDP undertakes due diligence on SMIT and awards contract
- UNDP likewise undertakes due diligence for vessel and crew and maintenance contracts and obtains necessary insurance
- Lease of vessel, crew and maintenance contracts secured by UNDP
- Vessel sets sail for Hodeidah
- In parallel, the UN and a small group of donors begin fundraising, with a pledging event to be held in April 2022

Phase 1 (weeks 1-9)


- Detailed planning by SMIT of operations, permits, mobilizing assets, equipment and personnel.
- Verification by SMIT of security and medical procedures.
- Vessel approaches SAFER from well-used international shipping routes, with breakthrough operation towards SAFER conducted across the minimum column of water in daylight, with good visibility.

- Assessment and inspection on board FSO Safer, create safe working environment for personnel and assets, preparations for STS and subsequent operations - it is recognised that during an operation of this scale with numerous considerations, planning will require fine-tuning following the inspection and during the operation.
- Pumping inert gas into the cargo tanks prior to arrival of receiving tanker.

Phase 2 (weeks 10-17)

- Mooring of the receiving tanker.
- Conducting STS transfer:
 - Maintaining cargo tanks of FSO Safer in inert condition.
 - Pumping of cargo tanks.
 - Stripping of cargo tanks.
 - Consideration of ballasting to compensate removed cargo weight.
- Conducting tank washing
 - Maintaining cargo tanks of FSO Safer in inert condition (with inert gas).
 - Washing of cargo tanks & disposal off wash water to a receiving tanker.
- Conducting de-mucking of cargo tanks and safe disposal of sludge
 - Purging and ventilating of cargo tanks.

Safer remains in an agreed position until new FSO is in place.



Ship to ship transfer vessel moored alongside – New Diamond STS in the Gulf of Oman performed by Smit Salvage




Figure 1: Indication of a tanker alongside the Vessel at the start of the STS operation. Due to transfer of cargo the height difference will shift from the Receiving Tanker to the FSO Safer.



Figure 2: Tankers moored double banked with fenders in between, surrounded by an oil boom – New Diamond STS in the Gulf of Oman performed by Smit Salvage.

4.3 Obtaining a suitable vessel into which the crude oil can be transferred

SMIT does not wish to be responsible for procuring a vessel but has engaged with its worldwide contacts to assist in this. Lease options for a VLCC for 18 months have been investigated by UNDP and are significantly cheaper than purchase and it is therefore proposed that this option be pursued. The lease options are for the vessel only and will require crewing and maintenance (ship management), which will be met by a contract with a crewing company. The possibility of a donation, as a humanitarian gesture, from a state in the region is being investigated and a final decision will be made before the end of March. It may be more viable to seek a donation of a vessel to be converted to an FSO, as the timescale for this is less tight.

5 Legal issues

5.1 Ownership of Safer

As noted earlier, the FSO Safer is owned by SEPOC, a Yemeni state company headquartered in Ma'rib. As initially the Safer will remain in place pending agreement on a long-term solution, ownership is not an issue that needs to be resolved prior to commencement of the emergency operation.

5.2 Ownership of Safer cargo of oil

The cargo of Ma'rib Light is owned by a number of different entities and there has been no update since 2015 so the exact amount of liftable oil is not known for certain. However, as the cargo will – at least initially – remain in situ in the new vessel there is no need to immediately determine whether these owners will consent to waive their entitlements so the oil can be sold and this can be done at a later stage.³ As the quantity and condition of the oil is not known, its value is currently unclear.

5.3 Liabilities in relation to salvage operation and to future storage of cargo

Legal advice is being taken on this, both by SMIT and independently by UNDP. This will need to include clarity on liability if there is a spill in the course of transferring the oil to the replacement vessel. Normally this would be covered by insurance but, as noted earlier, Safer has no insurance and this cannot be obtained for an out of class vessel. A RACI⁴ will be set up to show liability on the insurance during STS and storage.

6 Security Arrangements for the emergency operation

The transfer of the Safer cargo is a complex operation with numerous attendant risks. In accordance with SMIT/Boskalis normal procedures, Control Risks have undertaken both a threat analysis and a security risk assessment on behalf of the company. The UN has carefully considered all the recommendations to mitigate risks and these will be implemented. The key issues and accompanying mitigating measures are outlined below.

6.1 Managing the overall operating context

Yemen is a country embroiled in a conflict that has both national and regional dimensions. This has led to an unstable and unpredictable security context within the littoral area of the west coast. However, since mid-November 2021 the frontline has shifted to the south of Hodeidah governorate, roughly from just north of al Hayma on the coast to Hays, and some 90km from the port of Hodeidah. As a result, the immediate environment is less volatile than previously. The SFO Safer lies north of Hodeidah port and within the DFA area of control, and thus tight control over the immediate security environment can be expected. Numerous UN agencies have sub offices in Hodeidah and have developed good working relationships with the local authorities. Moreover, for the duration of the Safer operation the UN will deploy a senior and highly experienced liaison officer to be based in Hodeidah and have responsibility for relations between the UN, SMIT and the DFA. He will report directly to the RC/HC. The United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah⁵ Agreement (UNMHA) is also headquartered in Hodeidah and has a strong political team that follows developments in the

³ The parties agreed in principle that should the oil be sold, in whole or in part, at some future date then the proceeds could be used to pay for public servant salaries

⁴ RACI stands for Responsible - those who do the work; Accountable - approver and guides the "responsible"; Consulted - experts, they inform others, 2-way communication; Informed - need to be kept up to date, 1-way communication

⁵ There are multiple transliterations for the name of the port, this document uses Hodeidah as it is the one commonly used by Yemeni authorities in official documentation and signage, however where there is a specific name, such as the Hudaydah Agreement, the spelling is maintained as in the original.

area and is ready to support the Safer mission, including medical support. The UN has developed clear procedures for its operations, including movements of personnel and the deconfliction of all areas where UN personnel operate, and will within its capabilities support SMIT personnel to operate under these procedures. It also undertakes regular political analysis, which informs its operational decisions.

With respect to the broader operating environment, the UN continues to have its senior leadership based in Sana'a, with a strong presence in Aden, and has developed good relationships with all parties to the conflict. The RC/HC continues to use his good offices with all parties to resolve issues as they occur and to promote and maintain a functional operating environment. As part of this, he has sought and obtained agreement to the Safer operations from all major stakeholders in the conflict: the DFA, the IRG and the SLC. All parties see the operation as essential to the safety and security of the Red Sea and its shipping lanes, as well as to the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis, and all parties have expressed their wish to see it go ahead as soon as possible. This proposal is being shared with all relevant parties to ensure a common understanding of the operation, the actions to be undertaken and what each party has agreed to within this.

The RC/HC and his office have invested heavily in building and maintaining relationships of trust with all stakeholders, and this will continue during the process. A two-level mechanism will be agreed for solving any disputes that arise in the course of the operation; the first a local-level mechanism (see section 6.3) and then, if necessary, a more formal mechanism involving the parties as well as international stakeholders. Finally, the RC/HC's Senior Communications Advisor will develop a communications strategy in relation to all stakeholders, to help prevent or resolve misunderstandings that may develop (see section 8).

6.2 Regular agreed operating procedures

The UN will agree on security protocols with the DFA prior to the SMIT team's arrival in area. This will include relations with the DFA local security apparatus and agreement of the issue of people carrying weapons in the vicinity of the Safer operation. The Yemeni Coastguard remain a professional service, both in IRG- and DFA-controlled areas, staffed by career coastguards who have worked for the service since before the current conflict and they can be used to provide a safe environment in the vicinity of the FSO Safer. No weapons should be allowed on board the Safer itself due to the risk of triggering an explosion in its tanks. All other equipment on board must be intrinsically safe. The UN's Liaison Officer will ensure all local arrangements are in place and are agreed by all. If required, the UN could also set up a joint-operations centre.

The RC/HC will also ensure the IRG and SLC have an understanding of the details of the operation, agree to the arrangements being made and to the necessary operating procedures from their side.

As part of the operating procedures, the UN will take responsibility for the de-confliction of the operating area. This will be undertaken through normal procedures with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Emergency and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC) prior to the SMIT team arriving on the ground or the SMIT vessel arriving near the FSO. The KSA authorities have already agreed to this. The UN will issue a notification to EHOC of the Safer operation to cover the duration of all work. The locations of all people working on the operation will be placed within the SLC no-strike zones – as per normal operating procedures.

6.3 *Managing the day-to-day operating environment*

The Control Risk analysis notes that SMIT personnel will be operating in an unfamiliar environment where, because of the ongoing conflict, tensions can easily develop if, for example, there is an unexpected change of plan due to operational necessities such as unexpected conditions on board the vessel. This will be managed at two levels: the first ensuring the best possible team is in place and that they have the necessary support, and the second dealing with any issues that do arise.

With respect to the first, SMIT will need to:

- a) ensure all personnel operating in Hodeidah and on the Safer tanker have an appropriate profile for the work;
- b) ensure the leadership of the Safer operation has good diplomatic skills;
- c) work with the UN to provide adequate pre-deployment training and in situ briefings, including cultural awareness.

Critical to ongoing security will be that SMIT maintain good liaison with the authorities at all times and that any new developments or changes of plan are communicated and explained. The UN Liaison Officer will set up regular channels of communication, as well as being on call to deal with unexpected issues that might arise. The Fahem Group will also deploy a liaison person to Hodeidah.

6.4 *Travel, accommodation and emergency medical facilities.*

Travel will be in armoured vehicles and subject to the normal UN security procedures. A UN security officer will travel with the SMIT team. The route between Sana'a and Hodeidah is well used and regularly travelled by UN staff. The road to Ras Issa/Saleef port is likewise used regularly by UNMHA for patrolling both ports. Agreements for any road movements will be made with the DFA so that all checkpoints are aware of the operation and necessary movements. Agreed protocols should be observed. Accommodation will be in UN guesthouses and subject to the same procedures as UN staff. Both the UN Common Services and UNMHA run basic clinics and are working with SMIT's medical provider to look at ways of upgrading facilities. Both also have armoured ambulances and the road is tarmac all the way to Sana'a, after which there is an arrangement with AMREF Flying Doctors to airlift to Nairobi. UNMHA also have a helicopter stationed in Djibouti and this could be used for medical evacuation if agreements were made in advance for a suitable landing site and for procedures to agree flight clearances. Consideration of extraction of casualties from the vessel to a secure road access point is also needed.

6.5 *Dealing with risks associated with the vessel and salvage operation*

This will be the responsibility of SMIT, as part of its normal operating modalities. The vessel is old, single-hulled and has not been maintained for a long time. In particular, no inert gases have been pumped into its storage tanks since the boilers ran out of fuel in 2017. The risks associated with working on such a vessel will be mitigated by using an extremely experienced contractor that has undertaken this kind of operation in the past. A ship-to-ship transfer operation will be done based on the guidelines from International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), laid down in the Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gas. SMIT will create a safe work environment on board the FSO Safer prior to the commencement of operations. The transfer will be done independently of the FSO cargo handling and safety systems, with specialized mobile salvage equipment. Tank washing, purging, gas freeing and de-mucking upon completion of the cargo transfer will mitigate the risk of explosions. The Contingency Plan (see section 8) covers any spills in the course of the operation.

6.6 *Maritime hazards*

While maritime hazards are there, as would be expected in a conflict environment, it is the assessment the UN that these can be mitigated.

- a) Sea-Mines: Risk - Likelihood LOW, Impact VERY HIGH (life, reputational). There are drifting sea mines in the area and the risk they pose depends very much upon the time of year and currents. Since other commercial shipping accesses Hodeidah port maximum use should be made of the transit routes that these vessels use, keeping the distance of approach to the Safer to the absolute minimum. A break-through operation will then be conducted, as is standard for sea mined areas. Options for undertaking this are being considered as part of the overall risk assessment. The outcome of the risk assessment is to ensure a clear column of water for the SMIT vessel to approach the FSO Safer and then for the FSO Safer to depart.
- b) IEDs: Likelihood VERY LOW, Impact potentially VERY HIGH (dependent upon where a potential IED was placed on the vessel and its charge size). The likelihood is assessed as very low because of the political, ideological and financial motivations of the actors involved. If necessary, the UNDP counter-IED expert, who is among the most qualified explosive engineers globally, will go aboard and check the vessel. With humanitarian agencies now leading the field in IED disposal there is no need for military involvement. An explosive ordnance disposal expert undertaking an initial inspection/boarding would be sufficient.
- c) Limpet Mines. Likelihood VERY LOW, Impact potentially VERY HIGH. Limpet mines have been used against ships in the region, but there is little likelihood of them being deployed here. An expert could conduct an initial check of the FSO Safer hull and patrols around the vessel will mitigate any future sabotage attempts. Old limpet mines, if ever placed, would have detonated or self-neutralised by now. Any limpet mine explosion would be no greater than that inflicted by the known types of sea mines recovered in the region.
- d) Water-Borne IEDs (WBIEDs). Likelihood VERY LOW, Impact VERY HIGH. This risk will be treated via a security protocol with the DFA. Whilst the boats are often unmanned and operate via GPS waypoint, they can be mitigated by security patrols around the Safer.

6.7 *Land hazards:*

- a) Landmines: Likelihood VERY LOW, Impact potentially HIGH. As in many conflict situations, landmines are a remnant of war and pose a risk in the Hodeidah area and travelling from Sana'a to Hodeidah. This will be mitigated by ensuring the team uses only routes that are known to be swept of landmines and are in regular use, including by UN teams. Strict instructions will be given to stay on the main roads. Mined areas are well marked and thus can easily be avoided.

7 *Contractual and funding modalities for the emergency operation*

7.1 *Contract for SMIT operation*

UNDP will hold a contract with SMIT for the entire duration of the emergency operation, from initial assessment through transfer of oil cargo to receiving vessel and de-mucking and cleaning of the Safer. As part of this, UNDP has already:

- procured a company to undertake due diligence of Smit Salvage (technical qualification, solvability, pricing) and aims to have this work completed by March 31st.

- procured a law firm specialized in maritime matters to advise on contracting SMIT and on contracting a company to procure a vessel (by purchase or lease) as UNDP does not have this in-house expertise;
- Begun recruitment of a small team to support the project full time.

7.2 *Contracts for the receiving vessel and its crew and maintenance*

UNDP will undertake the necessary due diligence and contracting arrangements for the procurement of the replacement VLCC and the crew and maintenance arrangements for same. This will include procuring the necessary insurance for the VLCC.

7.3 *Funding*

A funding plan is in the process of being finalised, which includes options for support from the private sector as well as UN member states. A core group of donors are engaged in supporting the fundraising efforts. A large number of consultations have already been held and a pledging event will be organised, probably in April. Management of funds will be through the Peace Support Facility (PSF).

8 *Contingency plan*

Given the possibility that the Safer might spill oil before a successful transfer of its cargo is concluded, a contingency plan has been prepared by the UN and has been discussed with its partners and concerned donors. This plan outlines how the UN will support national efforts to respond to any major spill that occurs. Based on the plan, preparatory work is being undertaken, including identifying potential surge capacity. In addition, in February and March 2022 IMO and UNDP undertook comprehensive capacity building with the IRG and DFA authorities to support their national contingency plans. The UN support plan will be further developed in the light of this work.

9. *Communications*

The RC/HC's Senior Communications Advisor will draft a strategic communications strategy to support the operation and mitigate risks to the UN's reputation, including in the event of a catastrophic oil leak. The plan will be coordinated with the other partners engaged on the SFO Safer project, including national and international NGOs, civil society and contractors, the relevant authorities, regional actors and donors.

Key elements of the strategy are:

- Crisis communications plan in the event of an oil leak or other significant event impacting the process.
- Proactive communication of progress.
- Clarification of roles and responsibilities with respect to media and social media engagement, including management of media queries and widely circulated guidance on media/social media coverage of the Safer by the UN.
- Coordinated communications and message sharing among all partners
- Media monitoring and social listening for periodic feedback.

10. Budget and timeline

10.1 Budget for Emergency Plan (based on 18 months operation)

Activity	Amount in USD
Preparatory activities: due diligence and law firm	2,150,000
Salvage operation	35,000,000
De-mucking of FSO SAFER	5,000,000
VLCC 15 years old 200 DWT (lease)	13,687,500
Insurance machinery and hull	1,944,000
Insurance crude cargo	1,680,000
Crew and Maintenance of VLCC	12,915,000
Contingency	2,000,000
UN direct staffing and operational costs	2,936,534
UNDP management support @ 3%	2,319,391
Total	79,632,425

10.2 Timeline

Action	Date
<i>SMIT contract</i>	
Final proposal sent out to donors, DFA, IRG, SLC	22 March
Due diligence on SMIT finished	30 March
Draft SMIT contract prepared and negotiations start	2 April
Pledging event	Mid April
Written pledges received to cover at least \$35m	30 April
Contract with SMIT signed	30 April
SMIT start phase 1	1 May
<i>Vessel and crew & maintenance contract</i>	
Vessel identified	1 May
Due diligence completed on vessel	15 May
Contract for vessel prepared	1 June
Contract for vessel agreed both parties	15 June
Crew and maintenance company identified	15 May
Contract for crew and maintenance prepared	1 June
Contract for crew and maintenance agreed by both parties	15 June
Written pledges received for remaining monies	15 June
Vessel and crew sail for Hodeidah	1 July
Vessel docks alongside FSO Safer	15 July
<i>Ship to ship transfer and follow on works</i>	
Phase 2: Ship to ship transfer commences	16 July
De-mucking and cleaning complete,	13 September

Annex 1: Planning chart

	Preparatory works	Week 1-9	Week 10-17
Preparatory works	1.UNDP undertakes due diligence on SMIT and awards contract 2.UNDP undertakes due diligence for vessel and crew and maintenance contracts, obtains necessary insurance 3.Lease of vessel, plus crew and maintenance, contract secured by UNDP 4.Vessel sails to Hodeidah 5.In parallel, the UN and a small group of donors begin fundraising, with a pledging event to be held in April 2022		
Phase 1		1. Detailed planning by SMIT of operations, permits, mobilizing assets, equipment and personnel. 2. Verification by SMIT of security and medical procedures. 3. Vessel approaches SAFER 4. Assessment and inspection on board FSO Safer, create safe working environment for personnel and assets, preparations for STS and subsequent operations. 4. Pumping inert gas into the cargo tanks prior to arrival of receiving tanker.	
Phase 2			1.Mooring of the receiving tanker. 2. Conducting STS transfer: 3. Conducting tank washing 4. Conducting de-mucking cargo tanks and safe disposal of sludge 5. Safer remains at anchor until new FSO in place